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Comparing Abortion to the Holocaust 
 
Rónán Ó Fathaigh 
 
Amid all the discussion regarding the A., B. and C. v. Ireland judgment, it is interesting to note 
that last week, in one of its first freedom of expression judgments of 2011, the European Court of 
Human Rights was called upon to consider an interesting issue surrounding abortion, namely the 
conviction for defamation of an anti-abortion activist for comparing abortion to the Holocaust. 
 
The applicants in Hoffer v. Germany were anti-abortion activists who had handed out pamphlets 
outside a medical clinic in Nuremburg. The pamphlets urged support for ending abortion in 
Germany; however, the pamphlets also named a doctor at the clinic, Dr. F., describing him as a 
“Killing specialist for unborn children”. Moreover, the back page of the pamphlet included the 
following statements: 
 
Stop the murder of children in their mother’s womb on the premises of the Northern 
medical centre. 
 
Then: Holocaust 
Today: Babycaust 
 
The doctor and the medical centre initiated criminal proceedings for defamation against the 
applicants. At first instance, the German courts held that the actions should fail, as the pamphlet 
was not intended to debase Dr. F., and only conveyed the applicants’ general rejection of 
abortion. However, on appeal, it was held that the statement “Then: Holocaust /Today: 
Babycaust” had to be interpreted as putting the lawful activity of Dr. F. on a level with the 
Holocaust, qualifying him as a mass murderer, which amounted to abusive insult. The applicants 
were convicted of defamation and fined. 
 
The applicants made an application to the European Court, arguing that the convictions violated 
their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court applied its 
usual preliminary assessment under Article 10: it considered that the convictions amounted to an 
“interference” with the applicants’ freedom of expression, were “prescribed by law”, and 
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting “the reputation or rights of others”. 
 
The main question was therefore whether the convictions were “necessary in a democratic 
society”. Firstly, the Court noted that it must have regard to the special degree of protection 
afforded to expression of opinions which were made in the course of a debate on matters of 
public interest (para. 44). Secondly, the Court noted that the German courts had accepted that all 
other statements in the pamphlet, except the Holocaust reference, were acceptable elements of 
public debate (para. 45). 
 
The crucial passages in the Court’s reasoning were as follows: 
 
[46] In the view of the domestic courts the applicants, by comparing the performance of 
abortions to the mass-homicide committed during the Holocaust, had violated the 
physician’s personality rights in a particular serious way and could have been expected 
to express their criticism in a way which was less detrimental to the physician’s honour.  
 
[47] The Court further notes that the Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged the fact 
that the applicants’ statement could be interpreted in different ways, but considered that 
all possible interpretations amounted to a very serious violation of the physician’s 
personality rights.  
 
[48] The Court observes that the impact an expression of opinion has on another 
person’s personality rights cannot be detached from the historical and social context in 
which the statement was made. The reference to the Holocaust must also be seen in the 
specific context of the German past. 
 
Thus, the Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 10 as the convictions had 
represented an adequate balance between the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and the 
doctor’s personality rights.  
 
Comment 
 
The reasoning in Hoffer is questionable in a number of respects: Firstly, in considering the 
meaning to be attributed to the Holocaust reference, the Court makes no reference to the fact the 
impugned statements were contained in a pamphlet, and distributed by campaign activists. In this 
regard, the Court failed to refer to its previous case law on campaigning leaflets, namely Steel 
and Morris v. The United Kingdom where the Court laid down three pertinent principles: (i) that 
in a campaigning leaflet a certain degree of hyperbole and exaggeration is to be tolerated, and 
even expected (para. 90); (ii) that campaign groups play a legitimate and important role in 
stimulating public discussion (para. 95); and (iii) that there exists a strong public interest in 
enabling campaign groups outside the mainstream to contribute to public debate on matters of 
public interest (para. 89). 
 
The applicants were entitled to use provocative language to convey their disapproval of abortion, 
and it is to be expected that pamphlets will use such language. This view is supported by the fact 
the message concerned abortion, an important issue of public interest, and which has historically 
been the subject of extremely provocative debate. Freedom of expression has long been held to 
protect speech which “offends, shocks and disturbs” (Lindon v. France, para. 45). 
 
Secondly, while the Court expressly recognised that the statement was an opinion, the Court fails 
to apply the well established principle that “in order to assess the justification of an impugned 
statement, a distinction needs to be made between statements of fact and value judgments. While 
the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of 
proof.” (Lindon v. France, para. 55). Comparing abortion to the Holocaust is a value-judgment, 
not susceptible to proof. It is not for a court to determine the reasonableness of this view, and 
punish a person for holding such a view. While the main issue was whether the Holocaust 
reference was meant to refer to Dr. F., it being a value-judgment should have entered into the 
equation.   
 
Thirdly, it is worth noting that a criminal conviction (albeit in the form of a fine) was imposed on 
the applicants. The Court does not consider the chilling effect a criminal conviction will have on 
activists generally, and discourage participation in similar leafleting campaigns, in direct 
contradiction to the statement in Steel and Morris that there is a strong public interest in 
enabling campaigners to contribute to society generally. Criminal convictions deter such activity. 
 
All in all, the judgment in Hoffer is particularly bereft of reasoning: failing to place the 
statements in the context of a pamphlet, where hyperbole is to be expected; and failing to place 
importance on the statement being a value-judgment. When these issues are considered together, 
it is highly questionable whether attributing the meaning of such a statement to refer to a 
particular doctor, and not to abortion generally, is consistent with the high degree of protection 
afforded to freedom of expression under Article 10 on matters of public debate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
